Prinsburg State Bank v. Roland E Abundo, Lindsay T. Atwood, Robert Thurston, Donald R. Baker, Jeffrey Gold, Knighton Optical, Inc., and Alpine Vision, Inc. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Prinsburg State Bank v. Roland E Abundo, Lindsay
T. Atwood, Robert Thurston, Donald R. Baker,
Jeffrey Gold, Knighton Optical, Inc., and Alpine
Vision, Inc. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blake D. Miller; Joel T. Zenger; Miller Guymon P.C. Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Brad C. Smith; Samuel A. Hood; Stevenson and Smith; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, No. 20110755 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2946
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PRINSBURG STATE BANK, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLAND E ABUNDO, LINDSAY 
T. ATWOOD, ROBERT 
THURSTON, DONALD R. 
BAKER, JEFFREY GOLD, 
KNIGHTON OPTICAL, INC., 
and ALPINE VISION, INC., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Supreme Court No. 20110755SC 
Trial Court No. 060901846 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
An Appeal from a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Blake D. Miller 
Joel T. Zenger 
Miller Guymon P.C. 
165 Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Samuel A. Hood, No. 13245 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394 4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 0 2 2012 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PRINSBURG STATE BANK, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLAND E ABUNDO, LINDSAY 
T. ATWOOD, ROBERT 
THURSTON, DONALD R. 
BAKER, JEFFREY GOLD, 
KNIGHTON OPTICAL, INC., 
and ALPINE VISION, INC., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Supreme Court No. 20110755SC 
Trial Court No. 060901846 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
An Appeal from a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Blake D. Miller Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Joel T. Zenger Samuel A. Hood, No. 13245 
Miller Guymon P.C. Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
165 Regent Street 3986 Washington Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394 4573 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities iii 
Argument 1 
I. All Issues Presented for Appeal Were Preserved In the Record . . . 1 
The Stipulated Findings Preserved Rather than Precluded Issues for 
Appeal 4 
Conclusion 7 
Mailing Certificate 7 
-iii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Authorities 
American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo. 540 P.2d 1294 (N.M.1975) 5 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Security Mortgage. Inc.. 701 P.2d 1095 
(Utah1985) 5 
Patterson v. Patterson. 2011 UT 68, P.3d 1 
Seftel v. Capitol City Bank. 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 5 
-iv-
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reply Brief of Appellant 
Argument 
I. All Issues Presented for Appeal Were Preserved In the Record 
For the first time in this litigation-including the briefing before the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari-Guarantors claim that the entirety 
of this appeal was unpreserved. See Supreme Court Brief Appellant, 15-19. 
While this position plays opportunistically on the Court of Appeals decision, it 
contrasts sharply with Guarantors' positions taken previously. The preservation 
issue is simply not well taken and the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
otherwise. Moreover, the parties briefing establishes the extent to which they 
believed any issue had been not been preserved. The substantive issues on 
appeal, were preserved for meaningful appellate review. 
This Court held in Patterson v. Patterson. 2011 UT 68, P.3d , that 
preservation of issues of appeal is a prudential issue. Patterson. U 13. The core 
purpose of preservation-providing an opportunity for the district court to rule on an 
issue- has been met in this case, id-1112. The best indication of this fact is that 
in the Substantive Briefing before the Court of Appeals neither party raised a 
preservation issue, though the Court of Appeals ultimately ruled on that issue. 
To the contrary, Guarantors raised the preservation of appeals issue only 
in a very limited fashion. Guarantors asserted in their Brief that the Lenders third 
issue, whether the Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment in light of 
-1-
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Guarantors express waiver of the defensive impairment of collateral, was not 
preserved for appeal. Guarantors' Court of Appeals Brief, 3. Lender responded by 
demonstrating that this issue had in fact been raised in the record below, citing 
briefing in Guarantors' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
R.407. Lender's Court of Appeals Reply Brief, 5-7. Lender expressly pointed out 
the express waivers in the guarantees, in the record R.509-10. Lender's Court of 
Appeals Reply Brief, 5-7. 
The briefing before the Court of Appeals lays bare the parties beliefs and 
positions with respect to preservation. First, it was not an issue that was simply 
ignored. The parties grappled with preservation where they believe it was a 
potentially applicable doctrine. Second, neither party believed that preservation 
had anything like the preclusive effect the Court of Appeals applied. Finally, both 
parties expressly explained to the Court of Appeals that they intended to 
preserve, not preclude issues for appeal. 
The Guarantors acknowledged in their reply memorandum to supplemental 
brief before the Court of Appeals that "The Findings and Conclusions, however, is 
a significant document that in essence was an acknowledgment by the parties of 
what the Court had rule in the Memorandum Decision and what the parties 
expected that the Court would find and conclude on the remaining issues for trial, 
the commercial reasonableness of the collateral sale by Prinsburg." Guarantors' 
-2-
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Reply Memorandum to Supplemental Brief of Appellant, Court of Appeals, 1. The 
Guarantors further acknowledged that they "understood that Prinsburg would 
likely appeal the Trial Court's determination in the Memorandum Decision, 
Defendants did not understand that Prinsburg would, or could, challenge any 
agreed Findings of Fact." id-1-2. In point of fact, Lender appeals only legal 
issues arising from the trial court's memorandum decision; Lender does not 
challenge any of the stipulated facts. 
Moreover, Guarantors further acknowledged that Lender's "stipuations [to 
legal conclusions] were in the nature of an approval as to form of an order." Id. 
Oddly, Guarantor's briefing before this court appears to repudiate this prior 
acknowledgment. See, e.g., Guarantors' Brief, 22-23 ("Prinsburg Should Not Be 
Free to Challenge Stipulated Conclusions of Law."). 
The Court of Appeals seized on the language of the Findings that stated 
that the Findings "resolved this matter in its entirety," ignoring both the factual 
context and the acknowledgments of the parties to the contrary. The issues 
presented for appeal were preserved for review. They were first presented to the 
trial court for resolution. The Findings were a combined effort to (1) state the 
factual predicate of the case-facts which were undisputed for summary judgment 
purposes-and, (2) resolve the issues remaining for determination after the 
summary judgment decision. The Court of Appeals decision was erroneous and 
should be reversed. This matter should be determined on its substantive merits. 
-3-
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II. The Stipulated Findings Preserved Rather than Precluded Issues for 
Appeal 
The substantive language of the Stipulated Findings demonstrates both the 
Trial Court's error and the preservation of the central issue in this matter. At two 
different places, the Stipulated Findings expressly recite that as a result of the 
series of transactions Knighton, not Alpine, was the "sole owner" of the collateral 
in question. Appendix A, Findings, fflj 2, 7. Because at the time of the 
disposition of collateral Knighton was the sole owner-as the parties 
stipulated-Lender was well within its rights to simply in effect release any security 
interests that existed as a result of the Alpine loan and proceed against the 
collateral with respect to the Knighton loan. This is precisely what the Lender did. 
And it is precisely the set of facts that the Utah Courts have repeatedly 
authorized. 
Because Guarantors asserted no rights to the collateral in any answer, 
Lender was left with two loans, secured by the same collateral. Lender had the 
absolute right under the Guaranties to release the security interest in the 
collateral which secured the loan Guarantors guaranteed. Lender in effect did 
this. Lender then disposed of the collateral under the Knighton loan, applied the 
proceeds from that disposition to the Knighton loan and pursued Guarantors 
under the Alpine loan. The express terms of the Guaranties allowed exactly this 
course of events. Because there was no collateral securing the Alpine loan at 
-4-
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that point, none of the Article 9 requires for notice and procedural protections 
applied to the Alpine Guarantors. 
In effect, the Guarantors argue that Lender owed them some duty with 
respect to the collateral. This proposition has been repeatedly rejected in Utah. 
For example, this Court held that waivers of rights of impairment of collateral, 
such as applied in this case, are wholly enforceable Continental Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Utah Security Mortgage. Inc.. 701 P.2d 1095,1098 (Utah1985)(holding that a 
failure to perfect did not vitiate a guaranty). In Continental Bank. This Court cited 
American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo. 540 P.2d 1294 (N.M.1975): 
The Bank has the right to 'waive and release' the security at any time 
without the waiver or release affecting the Guarantor's obligation to pay. 
We find nothing inherently unreasonable in the terms of the guaranty 
agreement.... Where a guarantory [sic] or surety expressly and 
unequivocally consents to a waiver or release of his rights in collateral, he 
will not be heard to complaint about the failure of the guarantee to perfect 
the security interest therein in the first instance. 
Covolo. 540 P.2d 1298-99. See also Lender's Court of Appeal Opening Brief, 35-
41. See also Seftel v. Capitol City Bank.767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Under these cases, the unconditional Guaranties were fully enforceable against 
Guarantors. 
Guarantors earnestly assert that the notion of impairment of collateral has 
not been raised in this case. In the substantive briefing before the Court of 
Appeals, Guarantors made this assertion. In reply, Lender pointed out that the 
issue of enforcing the Guaranties was raised below in the Complaint (R.3). In the 
-5-
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briefing on the summary judgment motions, the express waivers of the 
Guaranties, the transfer of the Alpine business to Knighton, Alpine's termination 
as an entity was raised by both parties. R.407 (Guarantors discussing waivers); 
R.509-10 (Lender's discussion of the issue). The ownership of the collateral, the 
effect of ownership, the applicability of Article 9 to this matter, all turn on the 
effect of the waivers. These issues were raised in the briefing and in the 
Findings. Appendix A, Findings, fflf 2, 7. 
Guarantors now assert they have never broached the idea of a waiver of 
impairment defense. To the contrary, at Oral Argument on Summary Judgment, 
Defendant's own counsel repeatedly raised the complaint that the Bank's actions 
in this case unfairly impaired the Guarantors' rights against collateral. A true and 
correct copy of the transcription of the Oral Arguments on Summary Judgment on 
26 August 2008 are attached hereto. Exhibit B, Transcript, : 18-25,13:16-
14:22,21:18-22 :2,28:15-17. The heart of the Guarantors' claim that Article 9 
governed this case was the notion that the Guarantors were entitled to notice 
under Article 9 and that their rights in the collateral, including the right to recoup 
the collateral, or take other actions were impaired by Lender's actions. 
Here, the parties squarely put this issue before the trial court. The parties 
squarely put the enforceability of the Guaranties before the trial court. The entire 
argument that Lender is precluded from recovery because Guarantors were 
secondary obligors under Article 9 and entitled to notice turns on the question of 
-6-
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whether the Alpine loan continued as a secured obligation. The simple fact is 
that the Lender in effect released the collateral under the Alpine loan, sold the 
collateral, and applied the proceeds against the Knighton loan. In so doing, 
Lender acted within its rights. The trial court erred in treating this matter as an 
Article 9 deficiency case. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to reach the 
substantive issue. 
Conclusion 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that any issue had not been 
preserved for review. Preservation means providing the trial court with the initial 
opportunity to hear and resolve an issue. There is no dispute that the trial court 
here had a full, complete and fair opportunity to rule on every aspect of the 
enforceability of the Guaranties. Nor is there a claim that Lender waived or 
release any appeal rights (except as to the terms of the stipulated facts). The 
Court of Appeals erred in failing to reach the merits of this case. This matter 
should be resolved on the merits (which have been fully briefed) by this Court or 
remanded for resolution on the merits by the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this J c day of £pf1l, 2012. 
Brad C. Smith, Attorney for Prinsburg 
State Bank 
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^ic^o^j IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT .0, 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRINSBURG STATE .BANK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROLAND E. ABUNDO, LINDSAY T. 
ATWOOD, ROBERT THURSTON, 
DONALD R. BAKER, JEFFREY' 
GOLD, KNIGHTON OPTICAL, INC. 
. AND ALPINE VISION, INC. 
1 i 2089 
STIPULATED FUNDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 060901846 
.Honorable Scott M. Hadley 
Plaintiff Prinsburg State Bank and Defendants Roland E. Abundo, Lindsay T. Atwood, 
Donald R. Baker, and "Jeffrey Gold (collectively "Defendants"), by and through their respective 
counsel, stipulate to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which resolve this 
matter in its entirety in favor of Defendants with the exception of a determination of the amount 
of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to be awarded Defendants as the prevailing part}'. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In approximately 1994 Defendant Lindsay Atwood and a business partner formed 
Alpine Vision, Inc., which operated a vision care business at a number of locations along the 
Wasatch Front. 
2. In or around 19.97 Knighton Optical purchased a majority interest in Alpine Vision 
and within a couple of years-was the sole owner of Alpine Vision, including Alpine Vision's 
personal property, which included Alpine Visions eye examination equipment. 
3. Knighton Optical .caused Alpine Vision to enter into two loan agreements on March 
30, 1998 and August 2771999"wift First Secunty'Bank ("Alpine Vision Loan")JPlaintiff s " 
predecessor in interest. 
4. The Alpine Vision Loan totaled $ 150,000, and was secured by Alpine Vision's 
equipment, inventor)7, accounts, and general intangibles, 
5. Defendants Atwood, Abundo, and Baker each executed personal guaranties for the 
Alpine Vision Loan, on or about July 28,1999. 
6. Although Defendant Gold has no recollection of signing airy guaranty in relation to 
the Alpine Vision Loan, for purposes-of resolving this dispute, Defendant Gold stipulates that he 
is a guarantor of the Alpine Vision Loan. 
7. On or about February 15, 2001, Knighton Optical purchased the remaining interest 
in Alpine Vision and became the sole owner of Alpine Vision's.assets, including the collateral 
securing the Alpine Vision Loan. 
1 
r\ ^ '". t*" 
i (••. ? f r < 
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"8. On or about January 24, 2005, Knighton Optical made then last payment on the 
Alpine Vision Loan. 
9. In or around late 2006 and without providing notice to Defendants, Plaintiff and 
Vision Experts, dba Knighton Vision, held a private disposition of collateral in possession of 
Knighton Optical, including the collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan. 
10. No evidence ofthe value ofthe disposed collateral was presented to the Court. 
11. Plaintiff received $80,000 for the property, including the collateral securing the 
Alpine Vision Loan, in Knighton Optical5 s possession. 
12. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of the disposition proceeds that 
were attributable to the Alpine Vision Loan collateral. 
13. Plaintiff did not apply any of the proceeds from the private disposition to the Alpine 
Vision Loan but, instead, applied the entire amount to Knighton Opticafs debts. 
CONCLUSIONS" OF LAW 
1. Article 9'(Secured Transactions) ofthe Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by 
Utah ("Article 9") governs the transactions at issue in this case. 
2. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-702(l) ofthe Utah Code, the current version of 
Article ~9 ofthe UCC applies to Plaintiffs disposition of cdllatarel rather than the version in 
effect at the time the guaranties were signed. 
3. Article 9 governs Plaintiffs private disposition ofthe collateral securing the 
Alpine Vision Loan. 
D Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. Any transfer of the Alpine Vision, collateral to Knighton Optica] did not destroy 
the security of the Alpine Vision Loan. 
5. The fact that the guaranties authorized Plaintiff to proceed against the collateral 
does not negate Plaintiffs duty to comply with the requirements of Article 9. 
6. Pursuant to 70A-9a-102(71), the Defendants are secondary obligors of the Alpine 
Vision Loan, 
7. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-611(2), as secondary obligors, the Defendants are 
entitled to notice of the disposition of any collateral securing the obligation. 
... £. Therefore-, Plaintiff was required to provide notice loathe Defendants ofthe 
private disposition of collateral. 
9. Plaintiff violated Section 70A-9a-611(2) by failing to provide notice ofthe private 
disposition of collateral to Defendants. 
10. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-624, secondary obligors cannot waive their right to 
notice until after default ofthe obligations. 
• 1L Defendants did not waive their right to notice after Knighton Optical's default on 
the Alpine Vision Loan, 
12. Pursuant to Section"70A-9a-608? any proceeds from the sale ofthe Alpine Vision 
Collateral in excess ofthe reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement should have been 
applied to the obligation secured by the collateral 
13. Plaintiff failed to apply any ofthe proceeds from the sale ofthe Alpine Vision 
Collateral to the Alpine Vision Loan, in violation of Article 9. 
4 
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14. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-610(2). any disposition of collateral must be 
performed in a commercially reasonable manner, 
15. If the disposition of collateral is not conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner, the creditor is "barred from recovering a deficiency judgment against any guarantors. 
16. In light of the above facts and conclusions, including the lack of an)' evidence of 
the value of the collateral sold, Plaintiffs private disposition of collateral was not conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering deficiency 
judgments from Defendants. 
17. Defendants are the prevailing party .in this lawsuit and pursuant to the attorney fee 
provision in the subject guaranties, are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees and '' 
costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs claims. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
Defendants-shall submit an application for attorney fees for the Court's consideration. 
Defendants shall also submit a proposed Final Judgment and Order consistent with these findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The proposed Final Judgment and Order shall not be entered 
prior to a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs to be awarded 
Defendants. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
5 
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DATED this _ ^ day of jQjae. 2009. 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Honorable Scott M. Hadley 
SO STIPULATED: 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
Attorne}^ for Defendants Roland E. Abundo, 
Lindsay T. Atwood, Donald R. Baker, and Jeffrey Gold 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Prinsburg State Bank 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR1] 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-RINS3URG STATE BANK, 
) 
) Case No. 060901846 
ROLAND E. ABUNDO, ei ai, 
Defendant. 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
August 26, 2008 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADLEY 
Second District Court Judae 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintifj Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801)399-9910 
For the Defendant: Blake D. Miller 
LEGAL DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION 
424 E. 500 S. #300 
SLC, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-544 4 
Transcribed bv: Natal is J a K. e ,• \^*^j. 
152 Katresha St. 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
Telephone: (435) 59 0-5575 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P E C O E E P I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on August 26, 2 0 08) 
THE COURT: Folks, are you ready on the Prinsburg State 
Bank matter? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I've given you plenty of Lime to settle the 
case. I'll take a settlement proposal if you want. 
MR. MILLER: We didn't get there, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You wasted the time; is that what you're 
telling me? 
MR. MILLER: It (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Was it Mr. Smith, was he the problem? 
MR. SMITH: As usual. 
THE COURT: We just have a presumption here. I didn't 
know if you were aware of it. Okay. I'm teasing, Mr. Smith, but 
are we ready to go? Do you want me to call this case, or do you 
want to, Venna, who we welcome? 
COURT CLERK: I'm happy to. 
THE COURT: Do you have it there? 
COURT CLERK: Do you want me to? 
THE COURT: Yeah, if you've got it, go ahead. 
COURT CLERK: This is the time set for oral argument, 
case No. 06091846. It is Prinsburg vs Abundo, et al. 
THE COURT: Okay. We have attorney Brae: Smith appearing 
on behalf of the ulamtiff, and Counsel, I'll have to ash you tc 
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make your appearances. i torae: wno is wno. 
MR. MILLER: Ir is Elai:e Miller and Joel Lenger for 
defendants Abunac, Atwcod, Tnurston, BaKer anc Dr. Gold. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MILLER: I'm sorry, I'm correct, it's not Thurston, 
so thank you. Everyone else I indicated but him. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is the time set for -- as 
Venna mentioned -- oral arguments on really cross motions for 
summary judgment, the first being filed by the plaintiff. As I 
understand it, that motion is being withdrawn, and I've lost my 
note, but I think it was to Mr. Baker, wasn't it? 
MR. MILLER: Gold. 
MR. SMITH: To Mr. Gold. 
THE COURT: Gold. 
MR. SMITH: Dr. Gold. 
THE COURT: For the -- because of an admitted factual 
dispute as to whether he signed the guarantee, correct? 
MR. SMITH: That is correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So this, insofar as the plaintiff is 
concerned, is a motion for summary judgment regarding defendant 
Abundc, Atwood and --
MR. SMITH: Baker. 
THE COURT: -- Baker, not Thurston or Gold or Knighton 
Ootical cr Alome Vision, correct? 
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THE COURT: Okay. Then there's a cross motion that goes 
the other way. Now I've received all of these documents from tne 
aeiendants in this spiffy binder, and I'm assuminc these are all 
courtesy copies; is that right? 
MR. MILLER: They are, your Honor. 
THE COURT: So I can write on these, right? 
MR. MILLER: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MILLER: You absolutely can. 
THE COURT: Because if they are that way then I tend to 
keep my notes on them, so I appreciate that and thank you for 
that. I just wanted to make sure you didn't want them filed 
because my secret notes will go in there, so --
MR. MILLER: One more matter, your Honor, there's also a 
motion to amend, your Honor, with respect to the --
THE COURT: Oh, yes, thank you, there is. There's a --
and I wanted to address that first. There's a motion to file an 
amended answer by the defendants, and that looks right. I didn't 
know that, frankly, until late yesterday, so I've -- I quickly 
read the documents in relationship to that. Let me ask both 
sides a question with that. If that motion were granted -- well, 
either way, does that -- the ruling on that motion affect the 
cross motions for summary judgment? 
MR. SMITH: I think the other way around. I think a 
ruiino in our favor on the summary luacrment would obviate the 
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need for the amended -- the amendment, but the ruling on the 
amendment would not I think affect the summary judgment motions. 
MR. MILLER: That's probably why I think -- as I 
understand the bank's principle defense to tne amendment is 
futility, and that amendment qoes to the heart of the motion for 
summary judgment. So if you rule against the defendants then 
there would be an argument it would be futile. 
THE COURT: On the motion for summary judgment, right? 
If I ruled against the defendants on that. 
MR. MILLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MILLER: Other than that, I -- it is the central 
heart of what we're talking about. 
THE COURT: That's what it seemed like. It seems like 
the motion for summary judgments, I could get to the substance of 
those regardless of how I ruled on the motion to -- for leave to 
file the amended answer. 
MR. MILLER: I have no objection having addressed the 
other. It probably makes sense. 
THE COURT: The motions for summary judgments, the cross 
motions? 
MR. MILLER: Right, and the motion -- or we can 
(inaudible) that first and the motion to amend. It probably 
would help to do the motions for summary judgment first, your 
Honor . 
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THE COURT: Okay. That's what I wondered, because 
oftentimes it -- there's a motion for leave to file the amended 
answer tc correct some defect that's been found, you know, and i 
arises when a motion for summary judgment has been filed. That 
doesn't appear to be the case here. It seems like the substance 
of these arguments survive either way. 
• MR. MILLER: I believe so, but it clarifies the record 
with respect to one notice issue. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. Can we spend the time then --
I do have to leave, folks, at 5. I can't go past 5, and I'm 
hoping you won't get close to that, but --
MR. MILLER: Well, we can just have the defendants 
speak, your Honor, and I'll be happy to --
THE COURT: That would save some time, thank you. 
MP,. SMITH: I hope that's not an invitation for each of 
us to spend 35 minutes. 
THE COURT: No, that's why I kind of put the little 
disclaimer at the end. I don't mean for you to take it clear to 
then, but I just wanted to put a cap on it, too. I'm sorry for 
that. I do want you to spend what time you need, but I hope it 
doesn't go beyond that. Okay. So we'll start with the motions 
for summary judgment, and are you ready, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I thought we'll each aet two turns, 
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MR. SMITH: Your Honor, very briefly, :o emphasi: 
couple of fact issues to beam with, i don't believe there are 
inv aenuine issues or aisputed material tact . s case. :ne r• 
is no CISPU: that in '98 and
 x99 my client's predecesso: 
interest, First Security Bank, made loans to Alpine Vision. 
The 1999 interration (phonetic) of those loans included the 
commercial guarantees that are at the heart of this case. 
In 2001 -- pardon me. On a parallel track, First 
Security Bank also made loans to Knighton Optical at a time when 
Knighton and Alpine were separately distinct, non-affiliated 
corporations. 
In 2001, without involving the bank -- and I'm just 
going to refer to the bank to mean First Security Bank and now 
my present client, Prinsburg State Bank, who acquired First 
Security's interest -- Alpine and Knighton entered into a 
transaction without inviting the bank to be involved that set in 
course a couple of important issues. An agreement was signed by, 
among others, defendants Atwood, Gold, Baker and Thurston in 
which ail of their stock interests in Alpine were transferred to 
Knighton, and Knighton assumed and was aoie to exercise control 
and dominion over ail of Alpine's assets. 
Knighton agreed as part of that transaction to hold 
those shareholders harmless on any of Alpine's indebtedness, 
which presumably would have included trie loan that is aaair. at 
the heart of the present dispute. 
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Knighton makes payments on all of the indebtedness --
the Knighton indebtedness and ~he Alpine indebtedness -- until 
some point in 2 0 0 5 or 2006. The principals of Kniahton have 
subsequently filed bankruptcy, and Knighton itself -- Knighton 
Optical, in any event, is now a defunct corporation. 
As the bank is attempting to work through that 
situation, the collateral which initially was collateral for the 
Alpine loan, but it has ceased to be Alpine collateral because 
Alpine has ceased to exist, is sold and the proceeds of that sale 
of collateral are applied against the Knighton indebtedness. Now 
there's nothing in any of the documents that precludes that from 
occurring. Indeed, the commercial guarantees contemplate that 
exact thing -- that that exact thing may happen by specifically 
providing that the guarantor's obligations under the commercial 
guarantees will survive a modification of the underlying 
obligation by the bank, including the release of collateral. 
It's our position, therefore, that this lawsuit has 
nothing to do with Article 9, and therefore, none of the 
provisions regarding notice and the various protections that 
are in revised Article 9 have any application. As soon as 
Article 9 is taken out of the mix, we are then simply left with a 
straightforward contract case involving the interpretation of the 
continuing -- pardon me, of the commercial guarantees. I don't 
think there's any dispute that the commercial guarantees provide 
a brGac legal obligation on the part of the guarantors to 
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guarantee not mere payment -- or net mere collection, but to 
quaraniee payment tc my client. In that sense the case 15 
indistinguishable from the Stravell Patterson case which we cite. 
This is a situation m which the guarantees were 
expressly written in a broad, broad fashion to obligate the 
Guarantors to pay, irrespective of whether my clients exhausted 
collateral or didn't exhaust collateral, whether the loan was 
modified or not, and they expressly waived the right to complain 
if any of those things occurred. 
The rub comes in in the defendant's claim that there 
is somehow an obligation on my client's part to either keep the 
Alpine collateral segregated once this merger occurred, or to 
somehow proceed first against the Alpine collateral. The 
problem with that argument is in our estimation at least twofold. 
First -- threefold. 
First, there's no such obligation in any loan document 
that can be pointed to. Second, it's expressly contrary to the 
very thing the guarantors are guaranteeing, and expressly 
contrary to the very conditions that the guarantors waived when 
they signed the commercial guarantees. 
Third and most important in my mind, however, your 
Honor, is this. This is a commercial transaction. The 
defendants are all professionals. This is not a consumer 
ransacticr. with a Dan.»: ovei -weamnc someooav Duvmc; a OillC__ _- C. _ 
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transactions vatn Droiessionais 
They/ without inviting the bani: to the party, decided tc 
merge the two companies. At that point the defendants and the 
defendants alone were what you might call the least cost avoiders 
of this problem. It would have been a simple matter for them to 
call out the collateral, or to impose some obligation on Knighton 
to keep the collateral segregated, or to take some other action 
to protect'themselves, or to put the bank on notice that we are 
no longer guaranteeing these matters or to attempt to revoke 
their commercial guarantees, or any number of other commercially 
feasible actions. 
Instead what they did was they sold Alpine to Knighton 
for their own reasons, for their own profit, upon their own 
agreed terms, and subject to their own contractual obligations 
without notifying the bank. So long after they've taken 
advantage -- and I don't mean that in any pejorative sense, but 
long after they've received the commercial advantage of their 
transaction, their argument is basically that they should be able 
to pull apart the strands of the transaction and say, "Well, we 
should receive the benefits of our transaction and we should be 
relieved from the burdens." 
I don't believe it works anything like that. They 
signed commercial guarantees. By the time it came to enforce 
those guarantees the collateral was effectively exhausted, die 
not exist, at least not in the name that it then -- at least not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the name of Alpine a: that point, and they're left with the 
obligations owing unaer tne_r commercial guarantees. 
One otner matter tnat ~ would observe that Z tnink 
not been briefed by either party, nowever, ario it is simply tnis 
believe there's a substantial amount of legal work that will need 
7 I to be done because of course this transaction happens to straddle 
8 I the effective date of revised Article 9. The commercial 
9 I guarantees and the loan transactions that they relate to were 
10 I entered into prior to the effective date of revised Article 9, 
11 and there is some substantial work that would probably need to be 
12 done to determine whether revised Article 9 would govern the 
13 transaction. 
14 The application of revised Article 9 I think is the 
15 defendant's primary defense, at least to the summary judgment 
16 motion that we've filed and that the primary item advanced in 
17 their motion for summary judgment. Let me simplify a couple of 
18 things as we address that. I don't believe there's any dispute 
19 that the private disposition of collateral that occurred occurred 
20 without notice to these guarantors. The degree to which that 
! 1 J affects rights and obligations under either preexisting Article 9 
or revised Article 9 is a matter of some question to me, but 
there's no dispute that thev were not criven notice of the private 
Lispositior. c: .^atera_. 
Alpine Vision, though it was no longer an 
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entity in existence at the time was given notice, but the 
individual guarantors were not. However, as. indicated, J don't 
believe Article 9 has application in this matter for the reasons 
articulated in our brief and that I've adaressed to the Court. 
Excuse me. Unless the Court has any questions for me, I'll sit 
down well short of my 35 minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't at this point. Thank you. 
Mr. Miller, before I hear from you, let me just finish this note. 
MR. MILLER: Sure. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm ready. 
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, the law requires that lenders 
who take collateral, hold collateral, and/or sell collateral do 
certain things, and the terms of written guarantees cannot change 
those obligations, they're as follows. First, if the lender 
wants to foreclose the collateral, it must give notice of sale to 
those from which it will -- from whom it will seek a deficiency, 
both primary and secondary obligors, such as guarantors. 
The purpose of that is to allow those parties the 
opportunity to protect their rights, this under existing law for 
years predating revised Article 9, and Counsel is right, this 
wasn't briefed by either party, but I think it's clear, these 
provisions, under 9504 are the old Article 9 that I used to live 
with all the time is the same. You need to give notice, and it 
cannot be waived in a guarantee. It car., only be waived post 
default. 
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j e c o n d , t h e s a l e must joe commerc: 
w n e t n e r vou re a o i n o LOOI: U n a e r 95 0 
s d e s i g n e e t o r e a . 
t n e v a l u e c : t h e c o l l a t e r a l . T h i r d , y o u ' v e g o t 
:, i f t h a t ' s what vou d e c i d e t o d o ; you 've account icr 
the proceeds. You can't just keep them. Again, the law is the 
same under old Article 9 and new Article 9. 
The undisputed facts are that Prinsburg Bank did none o: 
9 I these. Let's talk about the notice of sale. Utah law consistent 
10 | with all other states who have adopted the Uniform Commercial 
11 I Code requires that notice of disposition of collateral be given 
12 to the debtor and all secondary obliqors and the guarantor is a 
13 secondary obligor. Revised Article 9 in Section 70A-9A-611, 
14 I don't have in mind the old version. I think it's 902 of the 
.5 I code, but it's been too many years now. I've probably forgotten, 
16 I This allows guarantors to pay the debt and redeem the 
17 | collateral, or get others to come to the sale and purchase it for 
value. Let's talk about the nature of the deal here. When one 
1 °> guarantees a debt, one does it as part of a package. The lender 
2 0 I takes collateral and the guarantors who have aareed in an 
unconditional guarantee -- and this is typical, stanaara, 
.uenaer, vou can ac aaamst me ;ou can reiease tne 
collateral. You can -- back to the debtor, by the way 
. U U wC 
maKe me ua\ :>ay it nrst, nowever, _ am 
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subrogated to the rights of the lender in that collateral. Now I 
have the collateral and I can enforce it 'against the debtor. 
So the secondary obligor such as the guarantor has to 
pay his guarantee, he has the lender's rights in the collateral. 
If it's released to the debtor, the debtor still has it, the 
guarantor has its rights against the debtor. Either way this 
collateral value is maintained. It is true, the lender -- and 
most of your unconditional guarantees will say, "Well, we don't 
know if we're going to go against the collateral or not. We 
reserve that right. We can release it. We can go after you 
first." It's true. The collateral -- you can't take the 
collateral, sell it and then not apply it. It has a choice. 
So a guarantor entering into these understands that 
it can seek -- if it watches, it can seek the value of the 
collateral. In this -- that notice that it must be provided 
under pre and post revised Article 9 cannot be waived. In fact, 
under 624 of revised Article 9 -- and by the way, it was 
effective as of the day they were trying to enforce these rights. 
The security agreement may have predated it, but the enforcement 
rights were pursuant to revised Article 9. It says a waiver of 
the notification of disposition of collateral must be entered 
into and authenticated after default. 
So :ontained in the Guarantee and ;ne iende: 
is relying or. that language in the guarantee as Prinsburg Ban] 
in this case, it is by law clearly insufficient. The waivers 
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thev are ciaimmc to reiy or. trie guarantee simply nave no 
e::ec: as to nc Oci:; l>t: 
to give notice, the Utah law has 
ciear on t m s since ino I rrobablv have the case wronc. The 
case I lived with for years, 1978 or x79, the case of ?MA Leasing 
vs. Pro Primers. In fact, the cite of that will be 590 P. 2 d 
03. You don't give notice, you don't collect the deficiency. 
9 Now there's a subsequent case by the Utah Supreme Court, 
10 it's the Quinn case. The Quinn case did back off that slightly. 
11 In Quinn it was a used car sales case. There was no dispute that 
12 the collateral was woefully inadequate to ever satisfy the debt. 
13 It was also undisputed that it was done commercially reasonable, 
14 J the actual sale. The Court cut the lender a break in that case 
13 | because of those facts. Utah law has been consistent for 30 
16 I years, long before revised Article 9 came into effect this 
17 I decade, and that is if you don't give notice of disposition of 
18 | collateral then you made an election not to seek a deficiency 
19 The sale must also be commercially reasonable. This 
2 0 sale was not advertised by the bank. It was not marketed to the 
bank. What occurred 
cnmK it comes out 
need to aive ttie History nere. 
the statement or tacts. 
re's a comoanv known as Kniahtor. Or 
. -_ _ a. _ . 
:nree D r a i n e r s , m n e n c e c iron: t n e i r 
: a r t e c t o f a l t e r , one of the c r o o n e r s , Dan 
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Knighton, wanted to continue with his wife and tnev started 
Led Knightor. Vision. What ir. essence occurred was 
:nat tne DanJ: saia, _ n e, t a K e a _ _ t n i s c o _ ± a t e r a. : n e t. i p I n e 
loan collateral, everything else, run it, make payments to me and 
then buy it." Knighton Vision made payments and bought it, but 
none of those proceeds were ever credited on the Alpine loan. 
Instead they've brought the action against the guarantor saying, 
"Forget the collateral, forget the money we got on that. You pay 
me the old balance, and you pay it to me now." 
Now maybe it makes sense for the bank to convert all 
this over to Knighton Vision. The Knighton Optical debts the 
bank owed dwarfed the Alpine Vision loan. It just dwarfed them. 
So maybe it made sense for the bank to say, you know, we're going 
to put our eggs in the Knighton Vision basket. We're going to 
allow Knighton's family to continue to operate the business, and 
that's better for us. We'd rather have a performing loan from 
Knighton and forget about Alpine Vision. That could have been 
what their decision was. 
It doesn't matter why, but the fact is it was their 
decision. The minute they sold us to the new Knighton entity and 
a lot of continuation of -- and redid those loans and sold that 
collateral without notice in a non-commercial reasonable manner, 
they made a decision, affirmative or otherwise, to release Alpine 
and tc release all secondary obligors. 
Now let's talk about this supposed sale from Alpine to 
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ever. get. to this situation is because by coincidence, First 
Security Bank was the lender of Alpine and also separately the 
lender of Knighton Optical. They were independent companies when 
they entered into those deals. 
There came a time -- yeah, they're in the same business. 
They're aware of each other. They are competitors. Knighton 
Optical buys the stock of Alpine. It doesn't buy the assets, it 
buys the stock. If you look at Exhibit U that's painfully 
apparent. It talks about all the stock of Alpine Vision being 
acquired by Knighton Optical, Inc., and that the shareholders 
shall surrender the entire stock of Alpine Vision to Knighton 
Optical. 
Paragraph 7, "In transfer of the stock of A.lpine vision 
by its shareholders to Knighton Optical." What -- it was a stock 
sale. A stock sale does not transfer and change the character or 
the ownership of the assets. They were owned by Alpine Vision 
before the sale of its stock, and they were owned after the sale 
of the stock by Alpine Vision. It is true, control of that 
assets derivatively through the stock was now controlled bv the 
Knighton Optical principals. 
The Alpine entity, though, continued. In fact, if you 
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sven sued them in this case as a separate company. Never has 
mere Deer a merger; a SZOCJ: sale was ai^ it. was 
riven n it nac, mere, n a c Deen a merger, :nt 
security interest of the bank is not altered. The security 
interest in the Alpine loan collateral continues through anv 
merger or sale. You can't defeat a bank security interest by a 
merger. It continues. It's up to the bank to enforce it or not, 
but that security interest, even if a merger, even if an asset 
sale would have continued in favor or Prinsburg bank. 
Now Prinsburg says well -- and because that security 
interest remained, Prinsburg has obligations under Article 9 as 
a holder of collateral. I must -- I can only sell it in a 
commercially reasonable manner if I choose to sell it, or I can 
release it back to the debtor in accordance with Article 9, but 
none of that was done. 
This wasn't released back to Alpine, it was sold, 
proceeds were received and nothing credited to Alpine. Alpine --
the loan of Alpine, Prinsburg just ignored when it came to 
allocating any proceeds. This stuff wasn't worthless. This was 
the optical equipment that would get going to a doctor's office 
or lab to get your -- the lenses cut, slit lenses, your lights. 
When you sit down at a doctor's office to have your eye examined 
and looking at the kind of equipment we're talking about here, 
uius the lab eauiDmen: in the back to make tne qlasses. 
It's undisDutec tne tax aeDreciatea DOOJC oasis c: tnese 
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asseis was not fair market value, but on m e nooks tne1 
aerre::a:? 
D a S I S , W £ S W O 1" t l :imes tne amour.; or tne .^itine 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
You're a guarantor, you'd feel pretty secure saying, "Well, 1 may 
have to pay off my guarantee, bur I've got collateral here. Once 
released to the debtor or I'm subrogated into his shoes, I can 
take care of this. It's worth five times at least the debt." 
Because no notice was ever given to these guarantors they were 
never -- they were deprived of that opportunity. 
As I said, the reason we even get to this point is the 
coincidence that First Security Bank was the lender of Alpine 
pre-stock sale and was also the lender of Knighton Optical. 
Let's think what would happen if there were two different 
lenders, and I'll just pick on a bank -- this is one I dealt 
with this morning. Bank of the West is the Alpine lender and 
Wells Fargo is the lender on Knighton Optical. 
When those stock sale comes over and Knighton now runs 
the business of Alpine, Bank of the West doesn't lose it security 
interest. Bank of the West doesn't say, "Oh, there's a merger, 
it's just gone. I can't complain now, I guess it's just over." 
Bank of the West security interest is as fully enforceable as it 
ever was, and there might even be a provision in their loan 
documents that say, "Alpine, you breached by doina an asset 
0£ oome are, some ion't even know 
in nere Decause we're so car Devona tnat, it no ionqer 
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matters. 
Tne key is, simply because it's the same lender on the 
Alpine side and en the Knighton Optical siae doesn't mean they 
can ignore -- just because they want to -- Alpine loan. It's a 
separate company. It has its own assets, and they're trying to 
enforce its own guarantee. My three clients did not guarantee 
Knighton Optical's debt, only Alpine Vision's debt. If they've 
merged it, given it up, released it, whatever, a guarantee only 
guarantees a principal obligation. If the principal obligation 
is gone, the guarantee goes away as well. 
What happens under Utah law if a creditor/lender takes 
the decision, "I'm not going to release collateral, I will 
actually go sell it," and I do a disposition of collateral, I 
don't even think it can be reasonably disputed when that decision 
is made Article 9 governs. That's what Article 9 says. You 
dispose of collateral, you must comply with Article 9. 
Yes, the bank Could have decided not to do that and not 
be bound by the commercial reasonableness or notice requirements, 
but it chose to sell it. The minute it made that affirmative 
decision it incurred the obligations. Utah law -- the Kagus case 
cited in our briefs just like no notice, no deficiency, this is 
also a guarantor case, your Honor, and also pre revised Article 
9. You sell it in a non-commercial reasonable manner without 
notice, you've waived your deficiency. We'll let you keep tne 
collateral, let you keep the proceeds of the sale, but you're not 
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acing arte: tne guarantors ior any more money, anc you re not 
aoinq after tne debtor for any more money, whicn is wnat tne bank 
is trying to do here. 
Third ooiigation, tne bank must account for tne 
proceeds. Your Honor, it seems like a fairly simple proposition 
that when a lender sells collateral, receives money, it ought to 
be applied to the loan and reduce the balance. "We don't have to 
rely on that simple proposition because Article 9, again dealing 
with when you sell collateral, says exactly that. That's 78A-9A-
608. You apply it first to the expenses of the sale, then to the 
balance. 
It's also undisputed, though, your Honor, that Prinsburg 
has never credited a dime from its disposition of the Alpine 
collateral toward the Alpine loan. Not a dime. It rather wants 
the guarantors to pay the full amount. Its got paid on some of 
this stuff. It doesn't care. It wants to be paid double. It's 
in essence enforcing a double payment. 
They got paid from the collateral and now wants to be 
paid from the guarantors, and that's not wnat a guarantee is. A 
guarantee says bank, you make a choice. You go after me first if 
you would like, I step into your shoes, but you don't sell the 
collateral, keep the proceeds and then sue me. I'm scrrv, vour 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-??-
sold the collateral, but never -- still seeking the original 
p rin ciP a _ amount. 
. n e case _,_aw is z±ear vour Hcncr, tne lenaers 
burden to establish how much is due. Tne lender has tc come in 
5 I and show by undisputed facts here's how much was due. All 
6 I know is they sold collateral, they didn't attribute any of it to 
7 I the debt, it was sold without notice and it was sold in a non-
commercially reasonable manner. As far as their motion for 
9 summary judgment, they can't even meet the first element, which 
10 is how much is due on the principal obligation for which the 
11 I guarantee is sought. 
12 I Your Honor, if it would be helpful, maybe this is a good 
13 time just to address quickly the motion to amend because 1 think 
14 it ties in here. If that's -- with your permission. 
15 | THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 I MR. MILLER: The motion to amend -- well, what had 
17 happened is I believe this action started in April of 2006. I'm 
18 replacement Counsel, so I'm going back on my record. The answer 
19 was done a couple of months later. The bank then sold the Alpine 
20 I collateral in August of 2006. This is the without -- the no 
notice, the not commercially reasonable sale. 
So it was in the context of discovery, these guarantors, 
because they weren't criven notice -- there's no dispute they 
w e r e r: Tnev nac. nc ciue wnat naopenec 
it was the context of discovery when they said 
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basically what happened to ail this stuff, they got a copy of the 
notice of disposition, found out wnat happened, and in the course 
of tne action they discovered tnis aefense and moved to amend. 
If you're looking at amendment, there is no dispute as 
to the facts. No notice was given, and that's all that amendment 
seeks is you didn't give us notice. It arose after the complaint 
was filed, and if you look at the requirements of Rule 15, it 
says when justice so requires, this was something that was only 
within the bank's knowledge. We didn't know because they didn't 
tell us. We didn't know they sold it because they didn't tell 
us, and the reason we didn't know they didn't sell it (inaudible) 
because we didn't have notice. We couldn't have found out 
without discovery. The bank wasn't volunteering it. 
So justice requires that in the course of litigation, an 
event that occurs during litigation that has an impact on the 
case, you ought to be able to amend. 
The second and probably most important thing is is there 
a prejudice to the other party, and there can be none in this 
case. There's no more discovery that needs to be done. Counsel 
itself admitted it's an undisputed fact, and that's all it is. 
They didn't give us notice. They've known this since August of 
200 6. It took us longer to discover it, but they've known this 
forever. We didn't know it. Thev do. There's no more discovery 
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So your Honor, we think the motion to amend should be 
granted. The bank has mace ; L S decision. The bank nas decided 
not to release the collateral. Trie bank decided not tc otherwise 
release its interest in the collateral but no enforce that 
collateral riernes under Article 9 of the code. The minute it 
made that decision it too): upon itself ail of the obligations of 
a secured lender under Article 9. Those are without question. 
You give notice, you sell it in a commercially reasonable manner, 
and you account for the proceeds. Not a single one of those was 
done . 
The law is clear that failure to do even one of these 
results in a no deficiency. They get to keep their collateral or 
their proceeds. They get to keep their new deal with Knighton 
Vision. All of that we're not asking to be set aside, but they 
have waived and are barred by seeking further payments from 
either Alpine Vision or the guarantors. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Final reply from your 
end, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: First of all, your Honor, let me address 
something Mr. Miller indicated that the bank hasn't even 
indicated what amount is due. I would indicate we have done so, 
and the defendants have electee not to dispute the amount due. 
There is no dispute here that the proceeds that were received 
from the sale of collateral were applied to the Knighton loan. 
So when Counsel speaks of a double recovery, that just simply is 
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the beginning of his argument. He starts with the proposition 
that the collateral in question at the time of its disposition 
was Alpine collateral, and that there was somehow an obligation 
on the bank's part to continue to treat that collateral 
separately. The chronology of what happened in this case 
demonstrates that the bank made no such election. The bank 
commences this action to enforce the commercial guarantees, and 
then months later disposes of the collateral and applies the 
proceeds of that disposal against the Knighton loan. 
Alpine had years previous ceased to exist as an entity. 
So Counsel is correct when he says in x98 or ^99, whatever the 
rime frame was, when the parries -- the defendants and Knighton 
and Alpine entered into the stock purchase agreement, that it was 
a stock agreement, not an asset purchase agreement, that is 
correct. Alpine did not maintain its corporate existence, and by 
2002 --. again, an undisputed fact here -- Alpine ceased to have 
legal existence. 
So what von .v nave is tne commercial guarantors 
having set up a cnain of events, ana now really they are saying, 
"well, we somehow want to assert rights that are Knighton's 
terms and procedures of the -- of Article 9," but thev cease --
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the company itself ceased no exist. There was no ownership by 
Alpine at that point:. It had beer: hopelessly cc-minalec with 
Knight or.. At the eno of the transaction that trie defendants set 
in motion -- not Prinsburg and not First Security -- at the end 
of thai there's one company that holds evervthinc. 
Now Counsel is correct that in and of itself that stock 
purchase agreement may not have been sufficient to transfer 
title. I don't really particularly disagree with that. That 
isn't what we are saying, however, because that's not the entire 
story that happened here. It's the at the stock purchase 
agreement in '99 -- Exhibit U -- pardon me, 2001 is when that 
was. It's the stock purchase agreement coupled with Knighton's 
co-mingling of the assets coupled with Alpine's forfeiture of its 
corporate charter coupled with Knighton's assumption of the debt 
coupled with Knighton's payment over time coupled with Knighton's 
agreement to indemnify these defendants, all of that taken 
together effectively put that collateral as Knighton collateral. 
Indeed Counsel may be correct that at some point in 
time First Security Bank or Prinsburg may have had a claim 
against Alpine for impairment of collateral. That may well be, 
and of course, who would be the obligated parties in that case? 
Presumably the shareholders that allowed, the impair -- or 
directors or officers who allowed the impairment to occur who are 
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liable. There is no double recovery because there was the other 
debt to Knighton, and the proceeds from the disposition of 
collateral were applied against that loan. 
With respect to the motion to amend, 1 think given 
Mr. Miller's presentation and mine, it's rather apparent to the 
Court, depending on how you resolve the summary judgment motion, 
it seems to me that the motion to amend rises or fails on that. 
If the motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of 
Prinsburg, then the amended complaint would be futile, and 
therefore the motion to amend should be denied. If judgment --
summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants, or 
alternatively I think I would concede if the Court simply denies 
both motions for summary judgment then the amendment should 
probably be allowed. Unless the Court has any questions, that 
would -- I'll submit the matter. 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't. Thank you. 
MR. MILLER: Briefly respond, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Okav. Yes. 
nave vcu out or nere )ien:v c••: 
2D 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
Mr.. MILLER: First, your Honor, mere is no evidence of 
a co-mingling. In fact, the evidence nas been contrary tnat the 
parties, Knighton Optical, even though it owned the stock of 
assets owned by Alpine and Knighton. If you look at Exhibit 11 
to -- I'IP sorry --
MR. SMITH: It would be Prinsburg's reply memorandum. 
MR. MILLER: Exhibit 11 to Prinsburg's reply memorandum, 
they set forth one of these listing of inventories. You'll see 
in there that they first talk about Knighton Optical's, and then 
at the end -- I better grab my glasses to make sure I'm right 
here -- it lists Alpine equipment under Alpine equipment, and 
then itemizes it by item. This was never co-mingled. It was 
a stock sale. And even -- again, even if it had been somehow 
merged and Alpine had gone out of business, the security interest 
survives, and that's the key. 
Because here's the rub, your Honor. All that doesn't 
matter unless the lender decides to enforce its collateral 
rights. The minute the lender makes that decision he's bound by 
Article 9. That's exactly what happened here. If you look at 
the notice of disposition of collateral, which is attached to I 
think our memorandum as wells as Prinsburg, it clearly is a UCC 
Arcicle S- notice. It's even titled, "Notification of private 
disposition of collateral." Wnen you're oisposinc of collateral, 
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yo\j have obligated yourself to do in in accordance with Article 
It references trie debtor. It references from secured 
party who is enforcing this collateral rights, Prinsburg State 
talks about when it will sell it. You know what, it even is 
giving notice to this entity they claim no longer exists, Alpine 
Vision. It's on the certificate of service, although my clients 
are not. 
So the bank is saying, "We're not bound by Article 9." 
They give an Article 9 notice. They grab the stuff, they sell 
it, and here's where we get in dispute. It is a double recovery 
because of this. The minute they take collateral they have a 
security interest in Alpine -- the Alpine loan. Whoever now owns 
it, because their security interest passes through. It survives 
changes of ownership unless it's sold in a commercial -- or a 
retail sale to a bona fide purchaser for value, which none of 
this was. 
The minute they try to enforce that security agreement, 
they've got to allocate the proceeds to the loan for which its 
I secured. That's the key. You've got to take -- if you're aoing 
to force tnat collateral, it's got to be the loan against which 
it was secured, 611 of the code. They've acknowledged, "We 
didn't do tnat loan, we did this loan. We took tne orcceeds here 
j 
and applied it to the Knighton Optical loan, so you don't get the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-30 
benefit of the guarantors. We iooJ; the collateral that secured 
the loan that you guaranteed and paid off this 1 o a r. . Got a 
problem with that?" Of course we do. 
Had they done it right, had they given us notice, there 
would be no deficiency. They are gettine a double recovery i: 
they took collateral that should have been applied to Alpine 
Vision loan, applied it to a separate loan, and then they're 
tying to get the guarantors to pay the entire amount. That is a 
double recovery. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just finish this thought. 
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I've been told I made a 
mistake. The asset list of independent (inaudible) Alpine's is 
Exhibit 11 to the guarantor's memorandum in support of their 
motion for summary judgment. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MILLER: I think I identified 'it as the reply memo 
as to the original (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Well, thank you both 
folks. It's too late and it's too close of a question for me to 
issue the ruling now, so I'm going to take it under advisement. 
I've got 60 days. I hope it doesn't take me that lone to do it, 
but --
MR. SMITH: Is this one you think will improve with 
time, your Honor? 
THE COURT: I think it will. This one is the fine line 
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cateqorv It should ae; bezzer as we qet closer -c zhe 6C 
Oi:a v . mere anv-nine e_se nov., :nouqL 
evervininq * neeo; 
MR. MILLER: I believe so, your Konoi 
10 
!j:ay . J. dciudi.y may nave mor- ~r.ar- i neeo. 
Anything else? 
MR. SMITH: Nothing that I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, folks. Very well briefed, 
very well argued. You've made it very difficult. Thank you for 
hat. Good lawyering, thouqh. Thank you both. We'll adjourn. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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